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Symposium: Selected Problems Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code 
FOREWORD 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
COMES OF AGE 
Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr.* 
I 
ONCE upon a time back in the elegant and well-ordered Victorian age, a new organization known as the National Conference of 
State Boards of Commissioners for Promoting Uniformity of Legis-
lation in the United States undertook the task of drafting a Nego-
tiable Instruments Law (NIL) for adoption by the legislatures of the 
various states. The law was finally prepared and recommended by the 
Commissioners for adoption in 1896, and, by December of 1900, :fif-
teen states had adopted it. In that month, Dean Ames, of the Harvard 
Law School, loosed a blast at this new law in an article in the 
Harvard Law Review.1 
Codification is with us a new art, and it is not surprising, although 
it is unfortunate, that the commissioners did not realize, as con-
tinental codifiers realize, the extreme importance of the widest pos-
sible publication of the proposed code, and the necessity of abun-
dant criticism, especially of public criticism, from practising lawyers 
and judges, professors and writers, merchants and bankers. It is 
far from an agreeable task to offer criticisms at this late hour.t Nor 
would the following criticisms be offered now but for the writer's 
conviction that the Negotiable Instruments Law ought not to be 
enacted by any state which has not yet acted in the matter, unless 
changed in important respects, and that those states in which it 
has been adopted should remedy its defects by supplemental legis-
lation. 2 
Dean Ames then proceeded to a detailed criticism of various sections 
of the NIL, with more or less telling effect, and concluded that "its 
adoption by fifteen states must be regarded as a misfortune, and its 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1937, University of Kansas; J.D. 
1940, University of Michigan. Editorial Board, Vol. 38, Michigan Law Review.-Ed. 
I. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARV. L. REv. 241-42 (1900). 
t [Footnote by Dean Ames) "The writer, although interested in the subject of Bills 
and Notes both as an author and a teacher, saw the Negotiable Instruments Law for 
the first time after its enactment by four state legislatures." 
2. Id. at 241. 
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enactment in additional states, without considerable amendment, 
should be an impossibility.''3 
Dean Ames' blows had found their mark. Judge Brewster, Presi-
dent of the group which by this time was known as the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, felt it neces-
sary to answer his criticisms in an article published in the Yale Law 
Journal.4 The merits of this answer were somewhat obscured by its 
obviously condescending tone. After reporting that a subcommittee 
of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had 
discussed the NIL with Dean Ames and had concluded that no change 
in the act was necessitated by his criticisms, Judge Brewster continued 
with these comments: 
It is with diffidence that I undertake to reply to legal criticisms 
from such a source and upon such a subject. The Dean of the 
Harvard Law School has so long been, not merely an expert, but an 
authority, on this subject, that I would not rashly volunteer to attack 
his positions. But, sometimes the point of view is quite as important 
as extensive knowledge and I am constrained to believe that so keen 
a controversialist is somewhat affected by the "gaudium certaminis" 
which the most open-minded advocate cannot wholly resist. Then 
too, if it is a question of experts, nearly all of them disagree with the 
Dean, on the main points at issue, as I shall try to show. If it is a 
question largely of practice and experience as a trier of cases, Pro-
fessor Am.es has none-while on the other hand, on all questions of 
custom and convenience, the practical knowledge of the hundred 
lawyers, and more, who framed the Negotiable Instruments Law, and 
the hundred bankers who adopted it, would seem to quite offset the 
mere conclusions of erudition. 
One who, like Professor Ames, can approach the consideration 
of a legal subject from the purely academic point of view, unembar-
rassed by any preconceptions derived from practice at the bar, has 
a certain advantage in that the matter may present itself to his view 
in scientific arrangement and symmetry from the first. Yet on the 
other hand, the want of just that everyday familiarity with com-
mercial affairs and business men, which every lawyer in considerable 
practice necessarily acquires, sometimes unfits the mere scholar or 
book lawyer to see things as others see them, and may make him 
give undue weight to what is really of little or no importance. Ac-
customed to deal only with theoretical questions and to measure law 
by ideal standards, such a man may demand a fulness of expression 
which amounts to prolixity, and discern obscurities where to the 
ordinary lawyer or merchant everything would seem plain and 
simple.5 
3. Id. at 257. 
4. Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L.J. 84 (1901). 
5. Id. at 84-85. 
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The first blows having been struck by the antagonists, the contro-
versy continued through a replication by Dean Ames6 and a rejoinder 
by Judge Brewster,7 both of which seemed to generate more heat 
than light. Dean Ames, in the course of his replication, did, however, 
demonstrate his ability to punch his way out of a corner rather 
adeptly. Caught by Judge Brewster in an inconsistency between 
statements made in his earlier writings and what he had said in his 
criticism of the NIL, Dean Ames extricated himself by admitting the 
"youthful indiscretion" of his earlier statements. However, he went 
on to point out that, even in his callow days, he would not have gone 
as far as the NIL had and concluded by thanking Judge Brewster for 
reminding him of an additional objection to the NIL.8 Once more 
Dean Ames was on the offensive and carrying the fight to his op-
ponent. 
In Judge Brewster's rejoinder, his earlier air of condescension 
had changed to one of obvious irritation and impatience with his 
adversary, as evidenced by this rather unique argument: 
The eleven subsections taken, most of them word for word, from 
the English Bills of Exchange Act, and all so identical therewith 
that the critic's [Dean Ames'] objections apply to the acts equally, 
need no justification at this late date. They have been the satis-
factory law of England and her colonies for twenty years. On them 
criticism is barred by the natural statute of limitations and the 
universal approval of the commercial world. One might as well 
criticise the Bill of Rights or the Lord Chancellor's Wig.9 
Fortunately at this stage of the controversy an obscure, dispas-
sionate, and wise individual-Mr. Charles L. McKeehan, Lecturer 
on Bills and Notes in the Law Department of the University of 
Pennsylvania-courageously stepped between the "arm-weary" an-
tagonists. In his self-appointed role as referee, he stopped the fight 
and quickly proceeded to shed more light on the merits of the contro-
versy than had either of the principal antagonists.10 Meanwhile our 
6. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law. A. Word More, 14 HARV. L. REv. 442 
(1901). 
7. Brewster, The Negotiable Instruments Law-A. Rejoinder to Dean Ames, 15 
HARv. L. REv. 26 (1901). 
8. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law. A. Word More, 14 HARv. L. REv. 442, 446-
47 (1901). 
9. Brewster, The Negotiable Instruments Law-A Rejoinder to Dean Ames, I5 
HARV. L. REv. 26 (1901). At another point, Judge Brewster swung wildly in this fashion: 
"It is the Dean against the world. Therefore so much the worse for the world. This 
eccentric heresy of the Professor makes his illustrations ••• utterly meaningless." Id. 
at 32. 
10. McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law (.tl. Review of the A.mes-Brewster 
Controversy), 50 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 499, 561 (1902). 
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statute, the NIL, unsullied by Dean Ames' proposed amendments, 
was adopted by the legislatures of all of our states and lived happily 
almost forever after. 
II 
This little episode in legal history stirred the emotions of aca-
demicians and set a "style among law teachers for the next forty 
years"11 and beyond. The style was never more evident than with 
the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code).12 The output 
of written material dealing with the Code has been prodigious,13 
and, as would be expected, has often pointed to flaws in the statute. 
Most of these suggested flaws could best be described, in the words 
of Judge Brewster, as "like spots on the sun. It takes an expert to 
see them, and he must use glasses at that."14 On the other hand, some 
of the defects, in the words of Dean Ames, "must inevitably be fol-
lowed, sooner or later, by additional legislation to remedy the evils 
which they ... introduce."15 
Whatever its flaws, it seems that the Code has finally come of age. 
During what might be called its adolescence-the decade from 
1952 to 1962-the Code was the subject of constant, critical exami-
nation by all interested segments of the business, professional, and 
academic community. Numerous amendments to the Code were 
made; some were important; some were more politic than vital. It 
was evident that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws had taken to heart Dean Ames' admonitions re-
garding proper codification procedures. It is doubtful that the good 
Dean, even in his fondest dreams, could have envisioned the publi-
city which has attended the development of the Code. By 1962, the 
Code had been adopted in eighteen states but was effective in only 
eleven states and had been effective in only two of those eleven states 
for a period of more than two years. At this writing, the Code has 
been adopted in forty-nine of our fifty states16 and this almost unani-
mous acceptance demonstrates the over-all merits of this magnificent 
11. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 79 (7th ed. Beutel 1948). 
12. For an example of the classic pattern, see Beutel, Proposed Uniform [1] Com• 
mercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952), and Gilmore, Uniform 
Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364 (1952). 
13. A quick check indicates that, from 1950 to date, there have been at least forty 
symposia and 300 leading articles published about the Uniform Commercial Code. In 
addition, there are more than 150 student notes and comments. 
14. Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L.J. 84, 97 
(1901). 
15. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law. A Word More, 14 HARv. L. REV. 442, 
449 (1901). 
16. Louisiana, with its civil law background, is the lone holdout. 
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statute. But the fact remains that the Code has been in effect and 
operation in only five of these states for a period of more than five 
years. At this point, therefore, the Code deserves the opportunity to 
prove itself in the rough and tumble of the market place for a decent 
period of time. The time for instant amendment of the Code on the 
basis of endless hypotheticals has passed. The words of Mr. McKeehan 
uttered in connection with the Ames-Brewster controversy seem to 
be appropriate: 
It is easy to lose one's perspective and sense of proportion in such a 
matter. The flaws in the act, few though they be, when grouped 
together and considered alone, seem formidable. Yet, when a survey 
is made of the entire statute, when one regards the many salutary 
provisions which settle disputed questions or introduce needed 
changes, when one studies the admirable simplicity and accuracy 
of most of its provisions and considers the comparative unimpor-
ta,;ice of most of the flaws which have been discovered, then the 
shortcomings of the [act] ... shrink to their real size and (though 
still apparent) do not seem likely to seriously impair its usefulness. 
. . . [T]he act having been started on its course and legislatively 
adopted in a number of states before these errors were discovered, it 
was decided, and no doubt wisely decided that it was unnecessary 
and impolitic to start the work of amendment at that stage of its 
career. The readiness of several state legislatures to adopt the act 
in spite of the criticisms that have been made upon it and the very 
small amount of litigation that has arisen under it in jurisdictions 
where it has been in force for several years, have thus far vindicated 
the soundness of the Commissioners' decision.17 
At this juncture, the real value of the wealth of written material 
on the Code, including the excellent articles in this symposium, lies 
not in triggering instant amendment of the Code, but rather in focus-
ing the attention of judges and lawyers on potential problems under 
the Code so that such persons will be better able to handle these 
problems properly if and when they arise. This complex statute will 
never be flawless, but constant tinkering could well do more harm 
than good. Most of the defects so far discovered can certainly be 
handled by intelligent interpretation of the statute as it now stands.18 
17. McKeehan, supra note 10, at 589-90. 
18. Again the observations of Mr. McKeeban in connection with Ames-Brewster 
controversy are apropos: 
Professor Ames has rendered substantial service to the Negotiable Instruments 
Law. He has pointed out the difficulties and possible dangers that lurk in some 
sections of it, and a careful study of his criticisms by those courts which will be 
called on from time to time to construe these sections, will serve to avoid some 
confusion and several unfortunate decisions. After all, many, if not most, of the 
flaws in the act can be overcome by a careful interpretation. 
Id. at 590. 
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All of this is not to say that the Code should be abandoned to 
the stresses of the market place for the next half century, as was the 
NIL. Orderly review of the Code's effectiveness in operation is called 
for. Changing technology may necessitate eventual revision of the 
provisions dealing with commercial paper, bank collections, and in-
vestment securities; the experiment in codification of principles and 
practices relating to letters of credit should be closely watched; and 
the secured transactions provisions should be the subject of long-
range review in light of developments in the market place. 
It is the announced intention of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to provide this kind of sur-
veillance of the Code and a Permanent Editorial Board has been es-
tablished for this purpose. Unfortunately, the operations of this Board 
to date have been haphazard and disappointing. If the Board is to 
accomplish its objectives over the long pull, it will be necessary to 
structure its operations more carefully. Orderly procedures for on-
going study of the Code and for periodic overhaul of the statute must 
be established and given appropriate publicity.19 If the work of this 
Board is properly organized and executed, hip-shooting legislators 
will hopefully be discouraged from riddling the Code with ill-con-
sidered and non-uniform amendments. 
19. Perhaps the recent establishment of the special Article Nine Review Committee 
is a step in the right direction. 
